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Appellant prosecution challenged an order of the Municipal Court for the San Diego Judicial District of San Diego County (California), that imposed a restitution fine against respondent unlicensed contractor and held it was precluded from a restitution hearing because respondent was convicted of unlicensed contracting under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7028 and other party to landscaping contract was not a "victim" under Cal. Penal Code § 1203.04. If you have plans to start a company, discuss with a business formation attorney.

Respondent unlicensed contractor entered into a landscaping contract with a party. Pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7028, respondent was charged with and entered a plea of guilty to engaging in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor without being licensed. The trial court ruled as a matter of law it was precluded from holding a restitution hearing because respondent was convicted of unlicensed contracting and the other party to that home improvement contract was not a "victim" under Cal. Penal Code § 1203.04. On appeal, the court vacated the judgment that there was no victim to the crime and there would be no restitution hearing because to adopt a per se rule that a licensing violation was a victimless crime defeated the purpose of legislation designed to protect the public from dishonest and incompetent contractors. The court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether the contract was in any way induced by the party's assumption that respondent held a contractor's license. If so, then party was a victim; if he entered into the contract with knowledge that respondent was not a licensed contractor, then he was not a victim of respondent's crime.

The court vacated the order that held the trial court was precluded from holding a restitution hearing and that as a matter of law the other party to the contract with respondent unlicensed contractor was not a "victim" because whether there was a victim should have been decided as a question of fact. The court remanded to the trial court to conduct a restitution hearing if it made a factual determination that contract party was a victim.

After a second trial, a jury of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) again convicted defendant of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery, and one count of burglary. The jury found true various sentencing enhancements and special circumstances, including that defendant had committed the murders in the course of robbing the victims. The jury returned a verdict of death. Appeal was automatic.

With regard to guilt phase issues, the court held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's requests for the appointment of cocounsel. Defendant, who represented himself during the pretrial stages of the proceedings but eventually chose to have an attorney represent him for part of the guilt phase of the trial, failed to make any compelling showing that the appointment of cocounsel instead of advisory counsel was justified. Defendant was provided with reasonable resources to present a defense. The trial court's error in instructing the jury it could infer defendant's guilt of murder based on his possessing recently stolen property with other slight corroboration of guilt was not of federal constitutional magnitude and was harmless. With regard to penalty phase issues, the court held that defendant's convictions in other states for robbery, escape and murder, were properly admitted under the then existing version of Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b). The absence of a non-unanimity instruction regarding mitigating evidence did not undermine defendant's constitutional rights. The trial court's exclusion of the irrelevant evidence of a coparticipant's sentence was not error.

The court affirmed the judgment in its entirety.