Thursday, 18 March 2021

Are you looking for corporate attorney in orange county, California?

 

HOLDINGS: [1]-The appellate court concluded that § 307(b)(1) of the federal Clean Air Act vests exclusive and original jurisdiction over challenges to a regulation known as the truck and bus regulation incorporated into and approved as part of California's state implementation plan in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; [2]-Because the first plaintiff's constitutional challenge to the regulation was subject to review under § 307(b)(1), the express preclusion-of-review provision of § 307(b)(2) applied; [3]-The second plaintiff's allegations regarding the verification procedure merely supported its challenge to the regulation, and were not independent grounds to give rise to a declaratory relief cause of action; [4]-Moreover, the challenge to the regulation's verification procedure requirements was subject to the jurisdictional mandate of § 307(b)(1) as well. Are you looking for corporate attorney in orange county, California?

Judgments affirmed for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff homeowner brought an action against defendant insurer, seeking payment on a default judgment entered against a contractor. The Los Angeles County Superior Court, California, granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment. The homeowner appealed.

The homeowner had entered into a contract for the construction of an additional building on his property. He later filed suit against the contractor, alleging defects in the construction. The contractor did not notify the insurer of the underlying suit. The insurer learned about the suit after the entry of default and unsuccessfully moved to set the default aside. The insurer argued that the insurance policy did not cover a default judgment entered without timely notice of the suit and that the contractor had failed to give notice in time for the insurer to protect its and the contractor's interests. The court concluded that summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of the insurer because the insurer did not make a showing that it suffered actual, substantial prejudice as a result of the contractor's breach of the notice provision. In order to demonstrate actual, substantial prejudice from lack of timely notice, the insurer had to show it lost something that would have changed the handling of the underlying claim. That the insurer was unable to investigate the claim thoroughly or to present a defense in the underlying suit did not satisfy the prejudice requirement.

The judgment was reversed.

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