HOLDINGS: [1]-The appellate court concluded that § 307(b)(1)
of the federal Clean Air Act vests exclusive and original jurisdiction over
challenges to a regulation known as the truck and bus regulation incorporated
into and approved as part of California's state implementation plan in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; [2]-Because the first plaintiff's
constitutional challenge to the regulation was subject to review under §
307(b)(1), the express preclusion-of-review provision of § 307(b)(2) applied;
[3]-The second plaintiff's allegations regarding the verification procedure
merely supported its challenge to the regulation, and were not independent
grounds to give rise to a declaratory relief cause of action; [4]-Moreover, the
challenge to the regulation's verification procedure requirements was subject
to the jurisdictional mandate of § 307(b)(1) as well. Are you looking for corporate
attorney in orange county, California?
Judgments affirmed for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff homeowner brought an action against defendant
insurer, seeking payment on a default judgment entered against a contractor.
The Los Angeles County Superior Court, California, granted the insurer's motion
for summary judgment. The homeowner appealed.
The homeowner had entered into a contract for the
construction of an additional building on his property. He later filed suit
against the contractor, alleging defects in the construction. The contractor
did not notify the insurer of the underlying suit. The insurer learned about
the suit after the entry of default and unsuccessfully moved to set the default
aside. The insurer argued that the insurance policy did not cover a default
judgment entered without timely notice of the suit and that the contractor had
failed to give notice in time for the insurer to protect its and the
contractor's interests. The court concluded that summary judgment should not
have been granted in favor of the insurer because the insurer did not make a
showing that it suffered actual, substantial prejudice as a result of the
contractor's breach of the notice provision. In order to demonstrate actual,
substantial prejudice from lack of timely notice, the insurer had to show it
lost something that would have changed the handling of the underlying claim.
That the insurer was unable to investigate the claim thoroughly or to present a
defense in the underlying suit did not satisfy the prejudice requirement.
The judgment was reversed.
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